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NOTES

of rents 12 and that there should be a specific provision for commercial lessees. 8
In the principal case, after declaring the lease contract in fact
unambiguous, the court correctly held that no stay should be
granted when the unequivocal terms of a commercial lease have
been broken, as the defendant's presence at the action for eviction is not essential.
Although there are a few weaknesses in the act, such as the
provision on rents, it does, nevertheless, provide security for men
in military service who might otherwise, by reason of their service, be subjected to injustice and oppression in civil actions.
W.F.M.M., JR.

TORTS-INDEMNIFICATION OF JOINT TORTFEASOR CONSTRUCTIVELY
LIABLE-CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY BETWEEN JOINT TORTFEASORS

-Due solely to the negligence of the defendant's agent in installing a gas stove sold by the plaintiff's indemnitees, the stove exploded. In an action for personal injuries sustained as a result of
the explosion, solidary judgment had been rendered against the
defendant and the plaintiff's indemnitee. Plaintiff, as indemnitor,
paid one-half the judgment, and, being subrogated to the indemnitee's rights against the joint tortfeasor, seeks restitution. The
defendant argued that the judgment rendered against the plaintiff's indemnitee as a joint tortfeasorl precluded the plaintiff from
showing mere technical liability and recovering the amount paid
12. See Comment (1940) 9 Int. Jurid. Ass'n Bull. 46, 50.
13. Ibid. The English act confers no special privileges upon members of
the armed forces as such but applies generally to all persons, including alien
enemies. Courts (Emergency Powers) Act, 2 & 3 Geo. VI, c. 67 (1939), as
amended by 3 & 4 Geo. VI, c. 37 (1940). Under this act the principle is not
established in England that any tenant or mortgagor is entitled to have his
ability to pay any particular installment determined by reference to his
means at the time it is due. See Comment (1940) 9 Int. Jurid. Ass'n Bull. 46,
50, n. 66; 33 Halsbury's Statutes of England (1940) 547.
1. The term "tortfeasor" is used to describe one who, for any reason, is
subject to liability in a delictual action. The word "tort" carries with it,
however, the suggestion of wrong-doing. Since in many cases tort liability is
imposed on a party where the actual conduct which subjects him to liability
is not his own, it is unfortunate that the same broad term is applied to him
as to one actually guilty of reprehensible conduct. Bohlen, Contribution and
Indemnity Between Tortfeasors (1936) 21 Corn. L. Q. 552. See also Leflar,
Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors (1932) 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
130. Louisiana, however, has adopted, together with common law tort rules,
common law term "tort" in the place of the civil law "delict" and "quasi
delict."
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on the judgment. Held, where the actual fault which is the proximate cause of an injury is attributable to one of two joint tortfeasors, and the other is only technically or constructively at
fault, indemnity may be obtained against the one primarily responsible for the act which caused the damage.2 American Employers' Insurance Company v. Gulf States Utilities Company, 4
So. (2d) 628 (La. App. 1941).
Indemnity is based on the legal notion of subrogation and the
relief it affords extends to the full liability of the innocent party.
Contribution, on the other hand, is founded on an equitable principle of equalization of what should be a common burden, permitting each tortfeasor to recover the amount paid in excess of
his proportionate share.3 Where a right to contribution between
joint tortfeasors is recognized, an insurer of one who satisfies a
joint judgment has been held to be subrogated to his rights
against the co-tortfeasors.4 However, the general common law
rule, independent of statutory alteration, permits neither indemnity nor contribution between joint tortfeasors.5
Various explanations for the strict common law rule have
been suggested: it has been said that a court should not lend its
aid to one who comes before it with unclean hands, that no man
2. The case reaffirms the position taken in Sutton v. Champagne, 141 La.
469, 75 So. 209 (1917) (where the adjudication was made in the original suit
by the injured party). See Appalachian Corp., Inc. v. Brooklyn Cooperage
Co., Inc., 151 La. 41, 46, 91 So. 539, 541 (1922).
3. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (1941) 1117, § 109; Note (1921)
5 Minn. L. Rev. 370. Contribution between joint tortfeasors should be compared with and distinguished from the civilian doctrine of comparative negligence which is applied in admiralty law and by statute in some jurisdictions. The comparative negligence doctrine applies to a situation where the
court or jury apportions the loss between the two wrongdoers according to
their relative fault. The doctrine of contribution among joint tortfeasors, on
the other hand, applies to a situation where one wrongdoer seeks contribution from the other after he has paid an In solido judgment to a third party.
See The Steamer Max Morris v. Curry, 137 U.S. 1, 11 S. Ct. 29, 34 L.Ed. 586
(1890). Harper, A Treatise on the Law of Torts (1933) 303, § 137. For an excellent discussion of the comparative negligence doctrine see Comment
(1936) 11 Tulane L. Rev. 112.
4. Underwriters at Lloyds v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388, 208 N.W. 13 (1926);
Frankfort General Ins. Co. v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co., 169 Wis.
533, 173 N.W. 307 (1919).
5. Royal Indemnity Co. v. Becker, 122 Ohio St. 582, 173 N.E. 194 (1930),
noted in (1930) 75 A.L.R. 1486. See also Prosser, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1111,
§ 109. Note (1932) 78 A.L.R. 580. The doctrine first appeared in Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 T.R. 186, 101 Eng. Reprint 1337 (1779).
6. Vandiver v. Pollak, 107 Ala. 547, 553, 19 So. 180, 182, 54 Am. St. Rep.
118, 123 (1895); Owensboro City R.R. v. Louisville, H. & St. L. Ry., 165 Ky.
683, 689, 178 S.W. 1043, 1046 (1915); Manowitz v. Ranov, 107 N. J. Law 523,
525, 154 Atl. 326, 327 (1931). Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability (1937)
25 Calif. L. Rev. 413, 425.
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can make his own misconduct the basis of an action in his favor,7
that potential wrongdoers should be deterred by the warning that
they enter the wrongful transaction with the risk of bearing all
the consequences,' that the court will not waste time with law
breakers at the expense of delay to honest litigants.9 The rule,
however, is subject to so many exceptions that it can scarcely be
considered embracive, 0 and its harsh effect has often led to statutory alteration. 1 As well established as the rule itself is the exception that one who is only technically a joint wrongdoer and
has not in any way participated in the wrong may exact full indemnity from the actual wrongdoer if compelled to pay damages
12
for the injury.
The question of contribution between joint tortfeasors was
first presented in Louisiana in Sincer v. Bell.'3 This case has been
argued as authority for the proposition that contribution could
not be compelled in Louisiana, but later jurisprudence has re4
fused to interpret the case as sanctioning such a doctrine.1 The
basis for permitting contribution between joint tortfeasors is
found in an interpretation of the articles of the Louisiana Civil
Code. Article 2324 makes joint tortfeasors liable in solido.' 5 Ar7. See Brown, Contribution Between Joint Wrongdoers (1917) 85 Cent. L.
J. 244. Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La. 289, 297, 151 So. 208, 211 (1933).
8. See Peck v. Ellis, 2 Johns Ch. 313, 135 (N.Y. 1816); Thweatt's Adm'r v.
Jones, 1 Rand. 328, 333, 10 Am. Dec. 538, 540 (Va. 1823).
9. See Avery v. Central Bank of Kansas City, 221 Mo. 71, 88, 119 S.W.
1106, 1111 (1909).
10. For example, where parties intentionally do an act which in good
faith they think lawful, but which in fact is tortious, contribution is allowed.
Brown, supra note 7, at 245. See also Notes (1932) 11 Tex. L. Rev. 367, (1935)
35 Col. L. Rev. 1310. See also note 11, infra.
11. See, for example, suggestions in Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions (1936); Law Revision Commission for the State of
New York, Report of the Law Revision Commission for 1937 (1937) 67-81.
12. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1114, § 109. This is the view adopted
by the American Law Institute. See A.L.I., Restatement of the Law of Restitution (1937) § 76. See also §§ 80, 86.
13. 47 La. Ann. 1548, 18 So. 755 (1895).
14. See Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La. 290, 296, 151 So. 208, 210 (1933): "Sincer v. Bell. . . is authority for the proposition that one of two joint tortfeasors who has been judicially compelled to pay damages committed by
them jointly has not a right of action against the other of the two joint tortfeasors who has not been judicially condemned to pay the damages."
15. The French text of the article was originally translated so as to make
co-trespassers, or joint tortfeasors, liable jointly but not in solido. By Act 20
of 1844 the article was "so amended as to make the English of said article
correspond with the French so as to make co-trespassers liable in solido."
Two or more defendants residing in different parishes who are answerable jointly or in solido may be sued at the domicile of any one of them.
Art. 165(6), La. Code of Practice of 1870. Gardner v. Erskine, 170 La: 212,
127 So. 604 (1930).
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ticle 2103 permits contribution between individuals bound in
solido and has been interpreted to apply to obligations ex delicto
as well as those arising ex contractu.16 However, this view is limited-by the rule that contribution may be compelled only where
the parties have been judicially declared liable in solido.17 This
position works injustice where the plaintiff chooses not to sue one
of the parties actually liable in solido. 5

Greater relief may be obtained in the federal courts. A joint
tortfeasor may be brought in as a party by the defendant, thus
assuring the defendant's right to contribution or indemnity, regardless of the party chosen for liability by the plaintiff.19 A recent English statute, 0 enacting in effect a rule of comparative
negligence as between joint tortfeasors, has met the problem by
allowing contribution without requiring any prior adjudication of
the liability of the party from whom contribution is sought. In
France the liability of joint tortfeasors is held solidary by the
jurisprudence independent of any code provision on the subject.
The commentators agree that the right to contribution is a necessary consequence of this doctrine2 and should be allowed even
16. Quatray v. Wicker, 178 La. 290, 151 So. 208 (1933). See Loussade v.
Hartman, 16 La. 117 (1840). The release of one of several debtors bound in
solido ex delicto extinguishes the debt as to the remaining co-debtors unless
the creditor has expressly reserved his rights against them. Irwin v. Scribner, 15 La. Ann. 583 (1860); Orr & Lindsley v. Hamilton, 36 La. Ann. 583
(1884); Recile v. Southern United Ice Co., 17 La. App. 611, 136 So. 179 (1931);
Crowell & Spencer Lbr. Co., Ltd. v. La Caze, 188 So. 446 (La. App. 1939).
See Art. 2203, La. Civil Code of 1870; Hall v. Allen Mfg. Co., 133 La. 1079, 63
So. 591 (1913). No particular form is required for such a reservation if the
Intention to reserve the right is clearly shown. Cusimano v. Ferrara, 170 La.
1044, 129 So. 630 (1930); Landry v. New Orleans Pub. Service, Inc., 177 La.
105, 147 So. 698 (1933). But if a written release is given without a reservation
therein, parol evidence is inadmissible to show such a reservation. Reid v.
Lowden, 192 La. 811, 189 So. 286 (1939).
Other rules governing solidary liability are applicable to that arising ex
deZicto.
17. Sincer v. Bell, 47 La. Ann. 1548, 18 So. 755 (1895). See Quatray v.
Wicker, 178 La. 289, 296, 151 So. 208, 210 (1933), noted in (1934) 9 Tulane L.
Rev. 125; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dejean, 185 La. 1074, 171 So. 450" (1936), noted
in (1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAw REVIW 235, (1937) 11 Tulane L. Rev. 494; Chaney
v. Hutches, 192 So. 556 (La. App. 1939); Gray v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 31 F. Supp. 299 (W.D. La. 1940). But see Appalachian Corp., Inc. v.
Brooklyn Cooperage Co., Inc., 151 La. 41, 91 So. 539 (1922).
18. Such was the' situation in Chaney v. Hutches, 192 So. 556 (La. App.
1939). See also Note (1938) 1 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 235, 239.
19. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 14, 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 723(c)
(1941), applied in Gray v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 31 F. Supp.
299, 304 (W.D. La. 1940). See Note (1932) 78 A.L.R. 580.
20. The Law Reform (married women and tortfeasors) Act, 1935, 25 & 26
Geo. V, c. 30, §§ 6, 7, 8.
21. 13 Baudry-Lacantinerie, Tralt6 Th~orique & Pratique de Droit Civil
(3 ed. 1907) Des Obligations 414421, nos 1303-1305; 3 Larombire, Theorie des
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where there has been no previous adjudication of solidary liabil22
ity.
Under the doctrine of comparative negligence, this repara2
tion may extend to full indemnity. 1
The conclusion reached by the instant case properly throws
the burden of making reparation for misconduct on the party
actually guilty, without danger of loss to the injured plaintiff.
The case may be held out as an example of the equitable conclusions that can be reached by means of careful interpretation of
the articles of the Civil Code without the necessity of special legislation.
G.R.J.

VENUE OF DIRECT ACTION AGAINST TORTFEASOR'S INSURER-Lou-

ISIANA ACT 55 OF 1930-Under the provisions of Louisiana Act 55
of 1930,1 which gives a right of direct action against a tortfeasor's
insurer, three injured parties sued a truck-owner's insurer for
damages growing out of the negligent operation of the truck.
Suit was filed at the domicile of the insurer. Exceptions to the
jurisdiction ratione personae and ratione materiae were sustained.2 Held, this statute gives a "right"s of action which can be
asserted only "in the parish where the accident or injury occurObligations (1885) 416, Art. 1202, no 22; 2 Planiol, Trait6 21mentaire de Drolt
Civil (10 ed. 1926) 315-316, H§ 900-903; 2 Sourdat, La Responsabilitd ou l'Action en Dommages-Int~r~ts (6 ed. 1911) 472, nos 1393-1394.
22. 13 Baudry-Lacantinerie, op. cit. supra note 21, at 419, no 1304; 2 Sourdat, op. cit. supra note 21, at 472, no 1395.
23. 13 Baudry-Lacantinerie, loc. cit. supra note 21; 2 Sourdat, op. cit.
supra note 21, at 472-475, nos 1395-1396.
1. La. Act 55 of 1930 [Dart's Stats. (1939) § 4248] adds the following
provision to La. Act 253 of 1918 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4248-4249] (which
gives the injured person a direct action against the insurer when the assured
is bankrupt or insolvent): "the injured person or his or her heirs, at their
option, shall have a right of direct action against the insurer company within
the terms, and limits of the policy, in the parish where the accident or injury
occurred, or in the parish where assured has his domicil, and said action
may be brought either against the insurer company alone or against both the
assured and the insurer company, jointly and in solido."
2. In the lower court plaintiffs argued that filing the exceptions to the
jurisdiction ratione personae and ratione materiae at the same time, defendants waived the former. The supreme court did not touch this point in its
opinions, but, by maintaining defendant's exceptions, It indicated sub salentio
that the exception to the personal jurisdiction was not waived. See Morales
v. Falcon, 167 So. 109 (La. App. 1936); Brown v. Gajan, 173 So. 485 (La. App.
1937).
3. "Right of action pertains to the remedy and relief through judicial
procedure. Cause of action is based on the substantive law of legal liability."
Elliott v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 35 S.D. 57, 63, 150 N.W. 777, 779 (1915).

